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1. Introduction 
 
In many countries, whether they have or not a federal structure, most public services (e.g., 
schooling, health care, public safety) are provided and managed at the local level, while they 
are financed – at least partly – with funds from the centre. The reason for Central 
government funding is usually recognised in the need of “equalising” the provision of such 
services across the country, since most of these represent constitutional basic rights for 
citizens. However, the provision of local public services can be affected by a number of 
different risks, which result in a potentially unequal level of provision1. For instance, 
natural disasters or terrorist attacks can destroy public schools or hospitals; organizational 
inefficiencies or even human mistakes by public employees can generate adverse welfare 
shocks that heavily impact on both the level and the quality of services. 
Indeed, in all the previous examples - which we classify as collective risks borne by local 
communities - two questions are put at the forefront of the public discussion whenever an 
unfortunate event occurs: what can public administrations do to alleviate the adverse 
welfare effects on communities hit by negative shocks? What should have been done in 
order to avoid the occurrence of these negative shocks? As for the first question, 
depending on the level of damage, a transfer policy aimed at providing initial help and at 
least a partial reimbursement by the central government of the adverse effects of the 
shocks is usually called for. This expresses a common claim for solidarity toward those 
communities who suffered welfare losses in the provision of local services, which are 
sometimes coupled with welfare losses at the individual level2. As for the second question, 
much of the damage (or some of its consequences at least) can be avoided by investing in 
mitigation3. In the case of floods, for instance, dams and barriers can be built to reduce the 
likelihood of losses occurring, or the severity of damage; in the case of clinical errors, better 
organized work shifts can be of great help. 
                                                 
1 Lockwood (1999) considers stochastic shocks affecting income disparities across local administrations, as 
well as the cost of producing a pure public good or the demand for the public good. We depart from this 
literature by focusing here on collective risks affecting the ability of local administrations to provide local 
services and – more importantly – by studying the potential role of private insurers in coping with these kind 
of risks. 
2 For instance, in the case of a natural disaster, the destruction of a school or a hospital will be almost always 
coupled with the destruction of private houses. 
3 As reported by Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler (2008, p. 5), “in many contexts every Euro invested in risk prevention 
returns roughly 2 to 4 Euros in terms of avoided or reduced disaster impacts on life, property, economy and environment ”. 
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However, the economic literature has almost neglected two features common to all these 
situations. First, the ex-post transfer is implemented by the Central government, which 
assigns financial resources to local administrations (municipalities, regions, hospitals, etc.). 
In this case, as shown by the vast amount of literature on fiscal federalism, a potential 
problem of opportunistic behaviour by local levels of government can emerge. But looking 
at our context, the possibility that the ex-post transfer can influence the ex-ante 
precautionary investment has been investigated only by Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007) 
and Wildasin (2008). 
Second, despite the possibility for public administrations to design intra-national risk-
sharing arrangements in order to alleviate localized economic negative shocks4, local 
administrations often buy coverage on private insurance markets, transferring risks to 
private companies. Examples include coverage for a variety of risks, from damage to public 
infrastructures to liability insurance for public administrations5.  
To the best of our knowledge, why a public administration should insure itself is a very 
intriguing question, that has never been addressed before. Indeed, as it has been suggested 
by the literature on public bankruptcies (see, e.g., McConnell and Picker, 1993), the 
imposition of new taxes, at least in principle, is in fact a remedy for coping with welfare 
losses that no private insurer can duplicate, and thus makes private insurance a Pareto-
inferior solution in a centralised framework. To put it differently, as Arrow and Lind (1970) 
have shown, the expected utility losses are approximately zero as the number of taxpayers 
becomes larger and larger. In other words, in a centralised framework, the costs of risk-
bearing can be optimally spread throughout the community by central government6. 
In this paper, we analyse different institutional arrangements to cope with collective risks, 
focusing on the potential role of private insurers in solving the under-investment problem 
                                                 
4 An example is given in the U.S. by the “rainy day funds” – more formally known as “budget stabilization 
funds” – i.e. States reserve funds used to partially offset revenue shortfalls and to maintain the level of public 
expenses (see, e.g., Maag and McCarthy, 2006).  
5 Private coverage for smaller collective risks is widely diffused: for instance, the “Supplement to the Official 
Journal of the European Union”, dedicated to European public procurement, weekly reports hundreds of 
tender notices from public administrations in the European Economic Area. Private coverage for larger 
catastrophic events is common especially in small countries and/or in the form of public-private partnership 
(e.g., Hofman and Brukoff, 2006; CEA, 2007; Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2008). 
6 As we will show below, buying a private insurance implies a direct cost (the premium, that possibly includes 
also a rent for the insurer) and an indirect cost (the dilution of incentives to invest in mitigation). Not 
surprisingly, insurance for public assets in some countries is consequently illegal (in Sweden, for example: see 
Linnerooth-Bayer and Mechler, 2008). 
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in protection stemming from the moral hazard of local administrations in a decentralised 
framework. In particular, we compare the welfare properties of a public mutual fund (i.e., a 
system of ex-ante defined inter-governmental transfers7) with those of a private insurance 
for local administrations, both in the case of a hard or a soft budget constraint. These two 
institutional arrangements require local administrations to pay a contribution – implicit in 
the case of the mutual fund, explicit in the case of a premium to be paid to an insurer – in 
order to obtain coverage for local collective risks. Our analysis shows that a public fund is 
always superior to the private insurance solution in the presence of hard budget constraints 
for local administrations. However, when the central government cannot credibly commit 
to an optimal transfer rule, private insurers are sometimes able to improve on the mutual 
public fund solution by inducing a higher level of precautionary investments. The main 
intuition for these results is that while the public mutual fund operates with ex-post 
contributions defined on the actual realisation of losses, private insurers need to define an 
ex-ante premium. This latter mechanism is less efficient because – given a level of equality 
among local administrations – an optimally designed public fund mechanism provides 
more incentives to invest in mitigation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the baseline model, 
and the outcome in the presence of a system of inter-governmental transfers, both under a 
hard and a soft budget constraint regime. The role of private insurers is discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 briefly concludes the paper. 
 
2. The baseline model 
 
Our analysis is based on a very simple and stylised model, somewhat in the vein of 
Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007). We consider a game where a Federal (“Central”) 
government interacts with N lower level (“Local”) administrations. One can think of these 
actors as Regional (or State) governments, or some other local autonomous public bodies 
                                                 
7 The Central government could finance the ex-post transfer policy with general-purpose reserve funds 
discretionally activated after the occurrence of the shock, or with specific funds which are regulated ex-ante 
and financed by the local administrations under exposure to a specific risk. This second type of arrangement 
is frequently used in order to publicly cover individual risks (think for instance to pension plans) even if they 
are rarely formally defined in the case of collective risks. In the next sections of the paper we analyse the 
properties of this type of fund, which we call “public mutual fund”. 
4
such as schools, hospitals, or universities. The main differences between the two layers of 
governments are related to the assignment of taxing power and to the management of 
public assets. Only the Central government retains the power to tax citizens, whereas this 
right is not awarded to Local administrations8. The latter are entitled to manage some 
public assets essential to produce local public services. The assets face specific risks: local 
administrations can reduce potential losses by investing in protection, but these 
investments are not observable by the Central government. A typical example would be a 
public hospital: risks range from clinical errors (assuming that the hospital is liable for the 
economic losses caused by such errors, as it is in many countries) to natural disasters which 
can hit the infrastructure. Managers can reduce clinical error risk by better organizing work 
shifts, and earthquake risk by adopting anti-seismic building techniques. 
The Central government C defines ex-ante a global budget NΩ of total transfers to Local 
(identical) administrations to be used for three main purposes: (a) current expenditures (i.e., 
expenditures for providing the public service); (b) precautionary investments; (c) repayment 
of losses. The global budget is fixed here to NΩ, even though the distribution of funds to 
the Local administrations might be discretionary depending on whether the Central 
government is able to commit ex-ante to a specific transfer rule or not. In the first 
decentralised situation we consider, the commitment to the transfer rule is credible (i.e., 
soft budget constraint problems are ruled out). This assumption is relaxed later in the 
paper. 
There is only one period: precautionary investments exhaust their preventive impact during 
the period that also coincides with the electoral cycle, at both the local and the central level. 
The timing of the game is defined as follows: 
 
a) first, Central government announces a ‘transfer rule’ T, i.e. the amount of funds 
that will be transferred to each Local administration (T1, T2, …, TN); 
b) then, Local administrations (acting simultaneously) define the amount of resources 
to be invested in protection Ii. Investments are not verifiable by the Central 
government (i.e., transfers cannot be contingent to investments); 
                                                 
8 This is clearly a simplifying assumption. In real world cases, local governments often have their own taxes. 
However, the central government retains the possibility to “equalise” resources by smoothing differences in 
fiscal capacity among local administrations. 
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c) Nature determines the realisation of loss di in each single administration i, which are 
assumed to be independent (i.e. Cov[di, dj] = 0) and observable by all players.
9 To 
simplify the presentation of our argument, we also assume that d takes up only two 
possible outcomes D (> 0) and 0 with probability respectively δ(I)p and (1 – δ(I)p). 
Investments I clearly influence the loss probabilities10; we assume that ∂δ/∂I < 0, 
∂2δ/∂I2 > 0, and we normalize δ(0) = 1; 
d) finally, the Central government implements the transfers, according to the pre-
determined transfer rule T and the budget constraint regime (hard or soft), and 
each Local administration i is able to define the (ex-post) budget for current 
expenditure xi = Ti – Ii – di. 
 
Central government’s payoff is represented by an “abbreviated” social welfare function 
(SWF)11, explicitly defined on a standard efficiency-equality trade-off, in order to account 
for both the total (expected) amount of current expenditures xi and the (expected) 
inequality in expenditures among Local administrations: 
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where x  is the mean expenditure of Local administrations. Notice that α (≥ 0) accounts 
for the degree of inequality aversion of the Central government: the higher α, the higher 
the loss in utility stemming from inequality. Moreover, as the first term in Eq. (1) is the 
sum of current expenditures, Central government payoff shows a sort of “aversion” to 
losses, since these clearly reduce the expected current expenditures.12 
                                                 
9 Notice that the independence assumption easily stems from the localised nature of these risks. Fires, floods, 
terrorist attacks, clinical mistakes are all investing in a specific local community, not a whole country. 
10 The literature (see for example Jullien et al., 1999) distinguishes between protection investments (when the 
investment is aimed at reducing the probability of the adverse event) and prevention investments (when the 
investment is aimed at reducing the severity of the damage). In our setup, I is consequently a ‘protection’ 
investment. 
11 An “abbreviated” SWF is an increasing function of efficiency and equality. This term has been introduced 
by Lambert (1993); Champernowne and Cowell (1997) use the alternative term “reduced” SWF. 
12 Notice that our payoff function can be derived as an utilitarian SWF that aggregates the utilities of risk-
averse individuals, or as a non-utilitarian SWF in the presence of inequality aversion per se of the social 
planner (see, e.g., Carlsson et al., 2005). The inequality index we are using – the variance of the current 
expenditures – belongs to the set of “appropriate” indexes considered in this literature. It is important to 
notice that our results do not hinge on the specific index we use, and hold also considering alternative 
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Local administrations’ payoffs are defined only on expected current expenditures: 
[ ] N,...,i;xE ii 1==Π  (2) 
The intuition behind this formulation is quite simple: local politicians are rewarded for local 
expenditures, but not for investments in protection, which are not observable by 
assumption. Hence, the higher xi,, the higher the probability they will be re-elected. Notice 
that we have modelled Local administrations as risk-neutral players13 and that the Central 
government’s objective is not the sum of Local government utilities. 
 
The transfer rule T defined ex-ante by the Central government takes into account the 
commitment to a global budget fixed to NΩ. However, Ti can be made contingent to the 
distribution of losses. If M is the number of Local administrations hit by losses D (0 ≤ M ≤ 
N), the transfer rule able to perform full mutualisation of losses is the following: 
( ) ( )MdddT iii −+= Ω  (3a) 
where ( )Md  = D M/N represents the average actual loss. In other words, the transfer rule 
expressed by Eq. (3a) can be interpreted as the sum of three components: (a) a symmetric 
flat transfer Ω; (b) a transfer from a ‘mutuality fund’ that repays each loss di (di = D or 0); 
(c) a contribution to the ‘mutuality fund’, equal to the average realised loss ( )Md . 
The Central government might prefer only a partial mutualisation of losses. The general 
form of the transfer rule is then: 
( ) ( )[ ]MdddT iii −+= ϑΩ  (3b) 
The second term, again, represents the working of the public mutual fund, composed of 
the reimbursement of losses ϑdi, and the mutuality contribution ( )Mdϑ  needed to finance 
(partial) reimbursements of losses. Clearly, ϑ ∈ [0,1] is the degree of mutuality, or namely 
the coverage. 
                                                                                                                                               
inequality indexes. Moreover, a sufficiently low α ensures monotonicity of the SWF. The use of a payoff 
function for the central planner allowing for the standard efficiency-equality trade-off is of course not new in 
the literature. See, e.g., Konrad and Seitz (2003), for the study of the optimal mutual insurance contract 
between States within a federation, and Picard (2008), for an analysis of the role of private insurance in the 
prevention of natural disasters. 
13 The assumption of risk neutrality for local politicians is quite arbitrary, as it is any alternative assumption. 
We rely of this hypothesis since it quite simplifies calculations. However, we will discuss the implication of 
relaxing this assumption in Section 4. 
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 The expected payoff for the Central government can then be expressed as: 
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where pDdˆ =0  is the expected loss in the absence of any investments, and: 
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(4a) 
Each term of the sum represents the variance of current expenditures among local 
administrations in the specific state of nature when M shocks occurred, weighted for the 
probability of such state of nature π (M). Notice that the first term in Eq. (4) (i.e. E[Σ xi]) 
does not directly depend on ϑ since ϑ only affects the level of compensating transfers 
(added to some Local administrations and subtracted from others).14 The term Ψ does not 
depend on ϑ either, and decreases as N increases.15  
 
Finally, the payoff of Local administration i is the following:16 
                                                 
14 As will soon become clear, the transfer rule indeed affects the investment strategies of the Local 
administrations, thus defining the ultimate amount of the budget that is free for current expenditures. 
15 As is evident in Eq. [4a], given N, Ψ is increased in particular by the terms where (N – M) and M assume 
similar values. When damage is uncommon, the probability of such states of nature decreases when the 
number of administrations (N) is greater. In the simplest case of only two Local administrations, the variance 
of current expenditures is equal to ( ) ( )( ) ( )
4
112
22 DpIpI ii
ϑδδ −− , which is the probability of observing an 
unequal outcome (only one Local administration is hit by a shock) times the variance of expenditures. 
16 Notice that the payoffs expressed in Eq. (4) and (5) are obtained assuming that losses can take only two 
possible outcomes, an hypothesis we maintain throughout the paper. Clearly enough, this assumption of a 
binomial distribution of losses is made only to simplify presentation. All of our results can be easily 
interpreted in the more general framework also, where losses are distributed according to a generic 
probability density function including those describing extreme events as discussed in Wildasin (2008). In this 
framework, the average actual loss ( )Md  and the average expected loss in the absence of precautionary 
investments 0dˆ  are still defined accordingly. The definition of Ψ becomes more complex, but it retains the 
property of independence from ϑ, and of a negative correlation with N. 
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2.1. The benchmark case: full centralisation 
We begin our analysis by defining a benchmark case, without any strategic interaction 
between different layers of government, and considering all decisions to be centralised. In 
this case, Central government defines both the transfer T and investments I in each Local 
administration. Remember that since Local administrations are identical, it follows that Ii=I 
∀i. The Central government problem can then be simplified to: 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ){ }I,NdˆIINmaxmax ,IC,I δΨϑαδΩΠ ϑϑ 20 1−−−−=  (6) 
Central government first determines ϑ (given I), then selects the amount of resources to be 
invested in protection I. The F.O.C. for the solution of the problem is: 
( ) ( )( ) 012 =−=∂
∂ I,NC δΨϑαϑ
Π  (7) 
which bring us to the optimal ‘degree of mutuality’ ϑ*c = 1 (where superscript c is a 
mnemonic for ‘centralised’).17 Notice that ϑ*c is determined by looking solely at the 
‘equality component’ of the Central government’s payoff function. Given the fixed budget 
NΩ, the result is not surprising: Local administrations will be sharing losses, whenever they 
occur. ϑ*c makes null the second term of Eq. (1) (the equality component): consequently, 
given ϑ*c, the Central government defines the optimal investment in protection I to be 
implemented, by maximising the ‘efficiency component’ of its payoff: 
( )[ ]0dˆIImaxI δΩ −−  (8) 
The F.O.C. implies: 
( )
01 dˆI
I
∂
∂−= δ  (9) 
                                                 
17 Identical results could be obtained in the case of observable investments, thanks to the opportunity for the 
Central government to design transfers which are contingent to the actual value of I. 
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which implicitly characterizes the optimal investment I*c.18 Interpretation of Eq. (9) is 
straightforward: marginal benefits of investing in protection (given by the marginal 
reduction in the value of expected losses) equals marginal costs. 
 
2.2. The decentralised case: the public mutual fund with credible commitment 
In the benchmark case all decisions are centralised. However, in most real-world cases, 
precautionary investment are in the hands of Local administrations; and these can decide 
their amounts, which Central government cannot observe. We solve the game by backward 
induction, and look for sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium. We then begin with the 
decision of Local administrations to invest, and then we analyse the definition of the 
transfer rule T (i.e. the level of ϑ) by the Central government. 
When each Local administration decides the optimal investments to be implemented, given 
ϑ, it will maximise its own expected payoff, considering only the total current expenditures 
x in its administration. The problem to be solved by Local administration i (see Eq. (5)) 
amounts to:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
−+−−−= ∑
=
N
j
jiiIiI dˆIN
dˆIImaxmax
ii
1
001 δϑΩδϑΠ  
(10) 
The F.O.C. for the solution of the problem can then be written as: 
( )
0
111 dˆ
N
N
I
I
i
i ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−∂
∂−= ϑδ  (11) 
which implicitly defines the optimal investment Ii
*, which clearly depends onϑ.  
Given that the Local administrations are identical, we will of course have Ii
* = I*d ∀i (where 
now superscript d is mnemonic for ‘decentralised’). Notice that – by simply comparing Eq. 
(9) with Eq. (11) – it is clear that protection investments are reduced with respect to the 
benchmark case, for every ϑ > 0; moreover, I*d decreases when N increases. This is a 
strategic effect stemming from ϑ itself: each Local administration prefers to free-ride on 
investments and spend in x; the free-riding effect being clearly emphasised when the 
                                                 
18 An interior equilibrium solution (i.e., I > 0) is obtained only if mitigation investments are sufficiently 
productive. More formally, in this case, only if δ′(0) < –1/ 0dˆ . We assume that δ′(0) is sufficiently negative in 
all the cases illustrated in the paper so that an equilibrium solution with positive investments always exists. 
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number of Local administrations is greater. Indeed, own investments increase the 
probability that Local administration will subsidise the other ones for (potential) losses, and 
this clearly reduces the incentive to invest. There is then a vertical externality quite common 
in the literature on fiscal federalism, which influences the optimal amount of ϑ that will be 
chosen by the Central government. This effect could be also be interpreted as a common-pool 
problem, since the mutual fund is a sort of public good whose financing is shared among 
Local administrations. Notice also that I*d will be strictly positive even when ϑ = 1.19 As we 
will show in the next Section, the presence of interregional externalities marks a striking 
difference between public transfer rules and private insurance mechanisms: when insurers 
are involved, the premium paid by a specific Local administration is not affected by the 
realisation of losses, while in the public case, each realised loss increases the mutuality 
contribution, dϑ , of each single administration (see Eq.(3b)). 
Given the choice of the investments to be implemented by the Local administrations, 
Central government will then define the optimal transfer rule T, which amounts to defining 
the mutualisation degree ϑ, since the total budget NΩ is fixed. The optimal additional 
transfer ϑ*d will stem from two countervailing effects: on the one hand, Central 
government has the incentive to fix ϑ*d as close as possible to ϑ*c = 1 in order to guarantee 
equality among local constituencies; on the other hand, by guaranteeing full mutualisation 
of losses, it reduces the incentive of a Local administration to invest in I, since ∂I*d/∂ϑ < 0. 
The problem to be solved can be written as: 
( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( )( )
( )ϑ
αδΩΠ
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(12) 
F.O.C. for the solution of the problem is: 
                                                 
19 The optimal investment I* monotonically decreases when ϑ and N increase, until it becomes zero. If the 
absolute value of δ ′(0) is sufficiently high, I* is positive in the whole range [0,1] of ϑ. See again footnote 16. 
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Eq. (13) shows the efficiency-equality trade-off implicit in the payoff function of the 
Central government.  
First, one can notice that the LHS of Eq. (13) – which corresponds to ϑ∂
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
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=
N
i
ixE
1  – is 
always negative for every ϑ > 0. Intuitively, the lower the additional transfer, the closer the 
investment will be to its efficient level, which in turn implies a better trade-off between 
investments and expected loss, hence higher current expenditures x. More formally, 
considering the F.O.C. in Eq. (11) and ∂I*d/∂ϑ < 0, one can show that: 
( ) ( ) 011 00 <⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −
∂
∂
∂
∂−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂+∂
∂−
N
N
I
IdˆI
I
IdˆIN
d*d*
ϑδϑ
δ
ϑ  
(14) 
given ϑ > 0.  
Second, the function ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −∑
=
N
i
i xxE
1
2 is always non-negative, and reaches a minimum at 
ϑ=1, when all losses are fully shared and expenditures equalised in every Local 
administrations. In particular, when ϑ < 1, ( )
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −∑
=
N
i
i xxE
1
2  strictly decreases withϑ, while 
for ϑ > 1 the inequality component of the payoff of the Central government increases. As 
a consequence, the RHS of Eq. (11) assumes negative values in the 0 ≤ ϑ < 1 range. 
Moreover, note that if α = 0 (i.e. the Central government cares only about efficiency), the 
F.O.C. reduces to Eq. (9) and investment will consequently be fixed like in the benchmark 
case. The higher α, the closer the additional transfer ϑ*d will be to 1, hence ( ) 0>∂
∂
α
αϑ d* .  
We are now able to show the following Proposition 1: 
 
Proposition 1: The degree of mutuality in the case of decentralisation is lower than the one in the 
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centralised case, i.e. ϑ*d < ϑ*c = 1, and ∂ϑ*d/∂N < 0. Protection investments I*d will be reduced with 
respect to the centralised case I*c, unless Central government cares only about efficiency.  
Proof: Directly from discussion above, since LHS of Eq. (13) is always negative and RHS 
of Eq. (13) is negative only for ϑ*d < 1, it must be that the optimal degree of mutuality ϑ*d 
is lower than the one in the centralised case ϑ*c = 1. As far as ∂I*d/∂N < 0, the optimal 
trade-off between efficiency and equality asks for stronger investment incentives, i.e. a 
lower ϑ, when the number of Local administrations increases. ■ 
 
Proposition 1, in line with the findings of Goodspeed and Haughwout (2007), suggests that 
decentralisation almost always leads to an inefficient outcome: precautionary investments 
will be reduced with respect to the centralised case. By fixing ϑ, the Central government 
trades off equality and efficiency: on the one hand, a lower ϑ is used to induce more 
incentives to invest in protection; on the other hand, ϑ must be higher in order to 
guarantee a sufficient degree of mutualisation of losses. Since we have ruled out 
commitment problems thus far, notice that the inefficiency stems only from the free-riding 
behaviour of Local administrations:20 risk is mutualised amongst all the Local 
administrations and the effort to lower the probability of negative events decreases the 
mutuality contribution dϑ  for all the participants. This inefficiency will be magnified when 
the Central government is not able to credibly commit to a pre-determined level of 
financing, a point that will be discussed below. 
 
2.3. The decentralised case: the public mutual fund when commitment is not 
credible 
We have assumed so far that Central government is able to commit to a predetermined 
transfer rule and a predetermined budget. While this may be true in some situations, 
                                                 
20 Interestingly, this idea of free-riding behaviour among local governments has received the attention of 
legislators. One example is the arrangement provided by Law 353/2000 in the case of forest fires in Italy. In 
the experimental period between 2000 and 2002, the Central government defined a budget of 10 million euro 
per year (NΩ in our notation) to be distributed to regional governments. In turn, regions redistribute financial 
resources to various municipalities according to the following rule: half proportional to the size of the local 
forestry area; half inversely related to the ratio between the size of forestry land destroyed by fire and the 
original size of forested land. As noted by Pazienza and Beraldo (2004), the law “has tried to introduce a 
management of the financial resources used in the fight of forest fires in such a way as to discourage any 
form of free-rider behaviour that could be taken up by regional or other local authorities”. 
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especially when the Central government cares only about efficiency, it is definitely difficult 
to sustain when large welfare losses occur. In the case of floods, earthquakes or other 
natural disasters, and more generally when there are huge losses, Central government might 
not be able not to renege on its ex-ante commitment. In other words, in all these cases, after 
the disaster occurred, Central government can step in and redefine the transfers ex-post.21 
Clearly enough, if Local administrations anticipate this move by the Central government, 
the announcement of the transfer rule at the first stage of the game is not credible. To be 
more precise, the actual transfer rule will be fixed after the state of nature (the level of 
damage in every Local administration) has been observed, and it will maximise ex-post the 
Central government’s payoff.  
The equilibrium strategies are easily obtained from the results of the previous section. 
Simply note that, since the first move of the Central government is “cheap talk”, the 
sequence of moves are reversed here: at the final stage of the game, given protection 
investments are sunk once losses are realised, the transfer rule has no incentive role, and 
Central government maximises the equality component of its payoff by fixing ϑ*dnc=1 
(whereas now superscript dnc is mnemonic for ‘decentralised and no commitment’), 
regardless of what was announced before; moving backwards, each Local administration 
decides the optimal investments to be implemented, anticipating the optimal response of 
the Central government. The problem to be solved amounts to:  
( )
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
−Ω+−=Π
∑
=
N
dˆI
Imaxmax
N
j
j
iIiI ii
1
0δ
 
(15) 
The F.O.C. for the solution of the problem can then be written as: 
( )
N
dˆ
I
I
i
i 01 ∂
∂−= δ , (16) 
which can also be obtained directly from Eq. (11) by setting ϑ = 1. Given our assumption 
of identical local administrations, the optimal investment implicit in Eq. [16] is symmetric, 
                                                 
21 Notice that this is a simple application of the well-known Samaritan’s dilemma, a typical situation of time 
inconsistency of public policies. See the seminal paper by Buchanan (1975). 
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i.e. Ii
* = I*dnc. Notice also that by simply comparing Eq. (16) with Eq. (11), protection 
investments are reduced by the inability of the Central government to commit to a 
predetermined transfer rule, since ϑ*d < 1 (see Proposition 1).  
We are now able to show the following Corollary to Proposition 1: 
 
Corollary to Proposition 1: In the case of decentralisation, when Central government is unable to 
commit to a pre-determined transfer rule, protection investments I*dnc will be reduced with respect to the case 
with perfect commitment I*d, unless Central government cares only about efficiency. 
Proof: Directly from discussion above.■ 
 
Notice that I*dnc will be strictly positive22 because a loss d in each Local administration, ceteris 
paribus, increases the mutuality contribution, dϑ , by the amount ϑd/N. However, for even 
a very small degree of inequality aversion by the Central government, the inability to 
commit to a pre-determined transfer rule will result in a lower level of investments in 
protection by Local administrations. Could the present situation be improved by allowing 
for a private insurance solution? This is what we will present in the next section of the 
paper. 
 
3. The role of private insurers 
 
In the previous section of the paper we assumed that Local administrations can recover 
from losses only by resorting to additional transfers by the Central government. As already 
discussed in the introduction, however, in many real world cases Local administrations (as 
broadly defined before) buy insurance coverage from private providers to hedge against the 
risks they face in producing local services. Therefore, one intriguing question is to 
understand the role of private providers as substitutes for the Central government system of 
inter-governmental transfers. Before moving on to a more formal analysis, we can list a 
number of advantages and disadvantages of private insurers. On the one hand, private 
insurers may be better suited than the Central government to observe a proxy for the 
                                                 
22 See footnote 17 again. 
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realised investment in protection. On the other hand, in the case of imperfect competition 
in private insurance markets, for instance, private insurers will gain positive profits, hence 
extracting rent from the public administrations. To avoid easy arguments in favour of 
institutional arrangements where private insurers can play a role, we rule out these 
possibilities here. We assume perfectly competitive insurance markets and we then 
normalise loadings to zero23. Moreover, we hypothesise that private insurers can only 
observe realisation of losses, as the Central government is able to do. 
In the presence of private insurers, the Central government will transfer the amount Ω to 
each Local administration, possibly leaving the private market the task of covering the risk 
of damage. The fair premium P charged by the insurer to the Local administration depends 
on the level of coverage λ, where λ is the share of total losses to be reimbursed. In 
particular, the premium is fixed equal to the expected loss, ( ) ( ) 0dˆIP λδλ =  and, in return, 
the Local administration receives the amount λd from the insurer. 
A crucial point to be emphasised here is what distinguishes the private solution from the 
public one. The insurer gets from the Local administration a premium which is defined ex-
ante (i.e., before the realisation of losses is known), and commits to repay ex-post a share λ of 
the actual loss. Conversely, the transfer rule T is wholly contingent on the distribution of 
realised losses. In other words, not only the reimbursement ϑd, but even the mutuality 
contribution ( )Mdϑ  (see Eq (3b)) - which is a sort of ‘premium’ paid to the Central 
government - is determined on the basis of the damage actually realised.  
Summing up, the funding mechanism of the Central government to the Local 
administration is very similar to the net flow of capital between the Local administration 
and the insurer: given a level of ex-ante coverage ϑ = λ, the term ϑd equals the amount 
paid out by the insurer λd, while the expected value of the contribution ( )dE ϑ  equals the 
premium paid to the insurer ( ) 0dˆIλδ . As for the incentive effect, however, a mutual fund 
is different from a private insurer: the (fair) premium P is a sunk cost for the Local 
administration, while the mutuality contribution dϑ  is fixed ex-post to cover the actual 
average loss. Hence, it does not represent a sunk cost for the Local administration and, 
                                                 
23 It is worth noting that we have already assumed the cost of managing the mutual fund by the Central 
government to be zero as well. 
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consequently, it generates different investment incentives. In other words, when the two 
mechanisms are based ex-ante on the same degree of coverage, they actually provide ex-
post different equality. This difference makes interesting comparing the risk allocation 
efficiency of the private insurer and of the mutual fund, that is what we do next. 
The premium charged by the insurer needs to deal with the moral hazard problem due to 
the unobservability of investments (Shavell, 1979). In particular, the insurer anticipates the 
disciplining effect of co-insurance on the investment strategy of the insured, i.e. 
( ) ( )( ) 0dˆIP Ins* λλδλ =  (where Ins is now a mnemonic for the ‘private insurance’ case). 
Let’s first assume that the Local administration can freely choose the coverage level 
together with the investment I*Ins: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )( ) 0 01dˆIP.t.s dˆIIPmaxmax Ins*ii iiii,Ii,I iiii λδλλ δλλΩΠ λλ = −−−−=  
(17) 
We drop subscript i, since each identical Local administration deals individually with a 
number of competitive private insurers. 
Noticing that investments are fixed after λ has been chosen and the insurance premium 
represents a sunk cost, the F.O.C. for the solution of the problem is: 
( ) ( )
( )λ
λδ
Ins*Ins* II
dˆ
I
I
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∂−= 011  
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and24: 
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(19) 
Summing up, none of the Local administrations purchases any coverage in the private 
insurance market, and the protection investments are fixed to the efficient level25. This 
result can be easily understood since the private insurer simply dilutes the investment 
incentives, and the optimal coverage is then the one that guarantees optimal individual 
                                                 
24 Remember that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 001 dˆIdˆIP δδλλ =−− . 
25 Notice that ∂Πi/∂λ < 0 when λ > 0.  
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incentives (see Eq. (9)). This solution – illustrated by Eq. (19) – maximizes E[Σxi]. 
Recalling our previous discussion, when a Central government simply provides a flat 
transfer Ω (i.e., ϑ = 0), the outcome is suboptimal given that - as we have already shown - 
minimal equality is obtained. 
 
An alternative strategy for the Central government could be the requirement of a 
compulsory minimal coverage level, λm. The maximisation problem of the Central 
government is then the following:26 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
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dˆI
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(20) 
which implicitly defines the optimal coverage level λ*m. The issue is then whether it is 
possible to obtain a larger payoff for the Central government if a minimal mandatory 
coverage λ*m on the private market substitutes the public mechanism described in the 
previous sections. Remember that the optimal transfer rule depends on the ‘credibility 
regime’, i.e. it is T*d when the Central government is credible, while it merely requests 
perfect ex-post equality when the commitment is not credible. By simply comparing Eq. (9) 
with Eq. (18), it is clear that if λm > 0, precautionary investments are reduced with respect 
to the benchmark case.27 This is a strategic effect which is different from the free-rider 
problem in the decentralised solution: in the present case, no positive externality is 
generated by precautionary investments in each single Local administration on the cost of 
coverage of the other ones. Here the level of investments is suboptimal because the unit 
price of coverage increases with λm in order to discipline the moral hazard. Each Local 
administration thus prefers to retain the risk and devote more resources to current 
expenditures x. By imposing a minimal coverage, the Central government trades off 
                                                 
26 Again, the strategies of the Local administrations are symmetric, so that we can simplify notation to Ii = I
Ins 
∀i.. 
27 Remember from footnote 23 that the Local administration will choose the minimal compulsory coverage. 
This is due to the risk-neutrality assumption of the players. When the risk aversion of Local administrations is 
sufficiently high, there is no need to impose coverage. 
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efficiency and equality. 
 
3.1. The case with credible commitment 
We first compare the private insurance solution to the public mutual fund when the ex-ante 
commitment by the Central government is credible. The decentralised and the private 
insurance solutions can easily be compared thanks to the following Proposition 2: 
 
Proposition 2: The decentralised mutual solution always dominates the private insurance solution when 
the optimal transfer rule is credible.  
Proof: The (market) incentive schemes expressed by Eq. (18) can always be perfectly 
replicated by the Central government (see Eq.(11)), i.e. for every value λ~ , the degree of 
mutualisation λϑ ~
N
N~
1−=  generates equal incentive schemes. In other words, since N/(N 
– 1) > 1, the incentive mechanism provided by the decentralised solution is more powerful 
than the insurer’s, namely, equal investments can be induced by the decentralised solution 
by means of higher coverage28. For every pair ( [ ]101 ,~;~
N
N~|~,~ ∈−= λϑλϑλ ) it is possible 
to compare ( )ϑΠ ~Cd  with ( )λΠ ~CIns . Since ( ) ( )λϑ ~I~I Ins*d* = , the efficiency component 
of the payoff is the same; consequently, ( )ϑΠ ~Cd  > ( )λΠ ~CIns  if and only if 
( ) ( )22 11 ϑλ ~~ −>− , which is always verified. ■ 
 
The decentralised scenario with a public mutual fund strictly dominates the private insurer 
solution when the number of Local administrations is finite. When the number of Local 
administrations tends to infinity, decentralised mutuality and private insurance become 
isomorphic, i.e. every strategy in both regimes can be perfectly replicated in the other so 
                                                 
28 The reason is that - given the coverage level - a higher investment I does not reduce the premium P, while 
it reduces the term ( )Mdϑ  in Ti. This is so because Ti is determined ex-post observing the number of actual 
realized losses M, and I influences Ti through M. The working of the mechanism becomes evident 
considering that complete insurance (i.e., λ = 1) generates null protection investments, while in the 
decentralised solution, even when ϑ = 1 protection investments are positive. 
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that ( )d*Cd* ϑΠ  = ( )Ins*CIns* λΠ .29 
 
3.2. The case when Central government is unable to commit 
We now compare the private insurance solution to the public mutual fund when the 
Central government cannot credibly commit to a predetermined transfer rule. In this case, 
Central government is expected ex-post to perfectly equalise current expenditures among 
local administrations in every state of nature (i.e., to fix ϑ*dnc = 1). The incentive constraint 
for Local administrations is then expressed by Eq. (16), leading to a payoff for Central 
government which is given by: 
( )[ ]0dnc*dnc*Cdnc dˆIIN δΩΠ −−=  (21) 
When the Local administrations are insured, the payoff for the Central government is given 
by: 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )( )( )20 1 λλδΨαλδλΩΠ −−−−= Ins*Ins*Ins*CIns I,NdˆIIN  (22) 
The question is whether an optimal λm can be chosen such that Π InsC > Π dncC, or: 
( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )( )( )2Ins*Ins*0Ins*dnc*0dnc* N 1I,NIdˆIIdˆI λλδΨαλλδδ −>+−+  (23) 
We need to distinguish between two cases based on the value of λ*m, the optimal minimal 
degree of coverage imposed by the Central government. First remember that ( ) IdˆI 0 +δ  
monotonically decreases with I, until its minimum for I = I*c (see Eq.(9)). Consequently, 
since both I*Ins< I*c and I*dnc< I*c, ( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )[ ]λλδδ Ins*Ins*dnc*dnc* IdˆIIdˆI +−+ 00  > 0 if and 
only if I*dnc < I*Ins. 
If λ*m ≥ (N–1)/N, then I*Ins(λ*m) < I*dnc:30 LHS of Eq.(23) is negative and the condition is 
never verified (remember that RHS is always positive). The public solution gives better 
incentives to the Local administrations and perfect equality: the private market solution is 
then dominated by the decentralised public solution even when the Central government 
cannot credibly commit to an ex-ante defined transfer rule. In the interval 0 ≤ λ*m ≤ (N – 
                                                 
29 Indeed, when N tends to infinity the cost of mutualisation for each single Local administration cannot be 
significantly reduced by its own protection investments. 
30 This is easily obtained by comparing Eq. (11) with Eq. (18), recalling that ϑ*dnc = 1. 
20
1)/N, I*Ins ≥ I*dnc and δ(I*Ins) < δ(I*dnc). Consequently, LHS of Eq.(23) proves to be positive 
and the condition in Eq. (23) is verified for some combinations of the model’s parameters. 
In particular, the private insurance market can generate higher payoffs for the Central 
government when, ceteris paribus: i) α is sufficiently low and/or the adverse events are very 
infrequent, i.e. when expected inequality is rather low or irrelevant, so that efficiency is 
more appreciated; ii) the productivity of protection investment is high, i.e. when the effect 
of better incentives is more valuable; iii) N is high, which implies a limited incentive 
advantage for the public solution. This discussion is summarised in the following: 
 
Proposition 3: When the Central government cannot commit to a predetermined optimal transfer rule, 
the decentralised mutual public fund solution always dominates the private insurance solution for λ*m ≥ (N 
– 1)/N. Under specific combinations of parameters α, p, δ, N, the private insurance solution dominates 
the decentralised mutual public fund solution if 0 ≤ λ*m < (N – 1)/N. 
Proof: Directly from discussion above. ■ 
 
Proposition 3 suggests that even when the Central government is unable to commit to a 
predetermined level of transfers, the welfare-enhancing role of the private insurer is rather 
limited. Notice that this result, combined with Proposition 2, is obtained by assuming 
competitive insurance markets. As we discuss in the next Section, by introducing some 
rents, the room for private insurers shrinks further. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In this section we discuss our findings, which can be summarised as follows: (a) when the 
Central government can credibly commit to a predetermined transfer rule, the public 
mutual solution is a welfare-superior institutional arrangement compared to the private 
insurance solution, since it provides higher incentives to invest in protection and the same 
degree of equality31; (b) when the Central government is unable to commit to an ex-ante 
                                                 
31 To recall the intuition for this result, this is due to the different incentives provided by the ex-ante premium 
of the private insurer and by the ex post contribution of the mutual fund, which is not sunk for the Local 
administration.  
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optimal transfer rule, the private insurance solution (if insurance markets are competitive) 
might improve welfare with respect to the public mutual fund when: i) the number of local 
administrations is large; ii) the degree of inequality aversion is low; iii) the probability for 
damage to occur is low; iv) the productivity of protection investments on the probability 
for damage to occur is large. At the equilibrium, the following inequalities hold: 
1c*dnc*m*d* ==<< ϑϑλϑ  (24) 
c*d*Ins*dnc* II,II <<  (25) 
c*
C
d*
C
Ins*
C
dnc*
C ΠΠΠΠ <<<  (26) 
This results obviously depends on the players’ payoff functions: however, if we had 
modelled the Local administrators as risk averse individuals, the incentive to invest would 
have been higher both in the case of public mutual fund and in the case of private insurer, 
so that the ranking expressed by Eqs. (24), (25) and (26) would have remained unaffected. 
Given that the public mutual fund provides more incentives to invest than the private 
insurance solution, the Central government prefers equality over efficiency in the case of a 
private insurance solution; hence, λ*m > ϑ*d according to Eq. (24). This makes the 
comparison between I*Ins and I*d unclear. Since the public mutual fund is always better than 
the private insurance solution when the Central government can credibly commit to a 
predetermined transfer rule, this comparison is irrelevant however. According to 
Proposition 3, I*Ins might be larger than I*dnc, but this does not guarantee that Π*Ins > Π*dnc. 
Notice that in Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) we have ordered precautionary investments and 
Central government’s payoffs assuming that the parameters of the model assign a welfare-
improving role to private insurers.32 
The rationale for these results is grounded in the institutional framework that we want to 
better illustrate in the rest of this section. Remember that in both institutional 
arrangements, local administrations pay a contribution – implicit in the case of the mutual 
fund, explicit in the case of a premium to be paid to an insurer – in order to obtain a 
coverage for these collective risks. However, while the public mutual fund operates with ex-
                                                 
32 In other words, Eq. (25) and Eq. (26) are obtained assuming that Eq. (23) is satisfied. Otherwise, we obtain: 
c*d*dnc*Ins* IIII <<<  
c*
C
d*
C
dnc*
C
Ins*
C ΠΠΠΠ <<<  
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post contributions defined on the actual realisation of losses, private insurers need to define 
an ex-ante premium. The second mechanism is less efficient in terms of providing the right 
incentives to invest in protection. 
The possibility that a private insurer could provide higher welfare in some specific regimes 
where Central government is unable to commit to a pre-determined transfer rule, can be 
explained by the different enforceability of the two “contracts”. From this point of view, 
we have assumed that the contract with a private insurer is intrinsically more credible than 
the public fund mechanism. In the first case, the Local administration needs to pay an ex-
ante premium P, and – in exchange – the insurer will reimburse a share λ of losses in case a 
damage occurs. Whenever one of the parties does not accomplish its contractual 
obligation, the other can recur to a civil court and ask for the enforcement of the contract. 
This enforcement is more credible than the one provided by an administrative or 
constitutional court, because the Central government can always renege on the 
commitment and – through a special law – pump more money into specific communities 
hit hard by a disaster. However, these conclusions are based on the hypothesis that the 
private insurer will never default; otherwise, this enforceability advantage might disappear. 
This no-default hypothesis might be true in the case of liability insurance for public 
employees, but becomes more difficult to sustain for catastrophe insurance. 
It is also worth noting that the mechanisms used by the Central government and by the 
private insurer in order to financially support the risks’ coverage are actually associated with 
different risk profiles of these parties. The ex-ante definition of the premium of the private 
insurer implies that he is the one who bears the risk that the collected premiums (based on 
the expected losses) are insufficient to cover the ex-post realised losses. However, since we 
have not taken into account the cost of capital needed to finance coverage, no disadvantage 
for the private insurance solution emerges from this aspect. On the other hand, we have 
modelled the Central government as a player that perfectly commits to an aggregate 
transfer equal to NΩ, so that he does not bear any risk similar to the one of the private 
insurer. However, in a more realistic situation the commitment to the ex-ante defined total 
transfer NΩ , may be not credible. One might ask whether this situation could affect our 
results. 
In particular, the Central government could be induced to increase ex-post equality by 
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transferring funds from constituencies not hit by losses to those that are damaged, given 
that the private insurer only partially covers the Local administrations. Recalling what we 
have already illustrated in par. 2.3, the Central government always equalises expenditures ex 
post when its commitment is not credible. As a consequence, the disciplining role of partial 
coverage used by the private insurer ceases to exist: the Local administration keeps 
mitigation investments low, relying on the intervention of the Central government. 
Consequently, the premium requested by the private insurer will be associated with those 
low investments. Summarising, the private insurer definitely loses its welfare-enhancing 
role if the Central government is unable to credibly promise that he will not pay for 
damage that is not completely reimbursed by a private insurer.  
A final difference is clearly in the private nature of the insurer, which maximises its profits. 
This is unlike the Central government, which aims at maximising welfare. If insurance 
markets are not perfectly competitive, there is an additional disadvantage of the private 
insurer solution which is not currently modelled in the paper, and further reinforces our 
main conclusions. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
In this paper, we have considered the institutional arrangements needed in a decentralised 
framework to cope with the potential adverse welfare effects caused by negative shocks 
which impact directly on the provision of public services and can be ‘limited’ by 
precautionary investments. We analyse the functioning of a public mutual fund (i.e., a 
system of inter-governmental transfers) aimed at covering losses from “collective risks” 
investing Local administrations. We then study the potential role of private insurers in 
solving the under-investment problem in protection that stems from the free riding of 
Local administrations facing a transfer rule by the Central government, which takes into 
account the equalisation of resources across Regions. Our analysis shows that a public fund 
is always superior to the private insurance solution in the presence of hard budget 
constraints for Local administrations. However, when the Central government cannot 
credibly commit to an optimal transfer rule, private insurers are sometimes able to improve 
on the mutual public fund solution by inducing a higher level of investments. In other 
words, our results suggest that an answer to the question of why a public administration 
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should insure itself is because private insurers act as strategic substitutes of redistributive 
policies for the allocation of collective risks. Public administrations do actually buy 
insurances then because they believe to be intrinsically unable to commit not to intervene 
in the case of an adverse welfare shock. In the light of our analysis, this solution is probably 
unwarranted for small risks, for which central government can commit to a hard budget 
constraint regime. It is probably not enough for large catastrophic risks, for which also 
private insurers become rapidly unfit. Not surprisingly, we observe mixed solutions (a sort of 
“public-private partnerships”), where a public fund is combined with compulsory private 
insurances for Local administrations. An interesting issue that remains to be analysed is the 
superiority of this mixed institutional arrangement. This is left for future research. 
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